Discuss at least two scholarly sources and at least two primary sources from the document attached.

What were the origins of the war and where does responsibility for its outbreak lie?

The Great War began with the declaration of war by Austria-Hungary against Serbia on July 28, 1914 and continued, despite popular belief that it would be “over by Christmas,” until November 11, 1918. In its wake, the First World War left ten million dead and twenty million wounded out of seventy million men mobilized and an untold number of civilian casualties from more than thirty-two combatant nations. After the war, disease, famine, civil uprisings and economic collapse added to the atmosphere of destruction. For those suffering, such devastation and loss of life required an explanation and a guilty party to take responsibility. The search for the origins of the war and the assignation of responsibility is not only a pursuit for historians, it was vital to the leaders of the nations and their people at the time as well. Even today, experts in foreign policy and international affairs continue to explore the origins of the war alongside historians in an effort to understand how such a war originated and to prevent another like it. Efforts to explain the origins and particularly to place culpability for its start on other nations began even before the war was declared. The leaders of these European nations may have seen the benefit of a war for their own national interests and even actively worked to promote one, but they recognized that their people would be more willing to fight if the war could be portrayed to them as a defensive war rather than one of aggression. With this goal in mind, five of the combatant nations created the “colored books,” collections of highly selective documentation displaying their own innocence in the start of the war and the guilt of their opponents. The German White Book is the most notorious but Austria-Hungary (Red), France (Yellow), Britain (Blue), and Russia (Orange) all created such collections that were often intentionally false but still convincing for the general public of that nation. After the war, an Allied Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcements of Penalties was created. It concluded culpability lay with Germany, Austria, the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria and led to the signing of treaties punishing these nations, particularly Germany, for causing the war.

Revisionist historians in the latter 1920s began the call to reassess our interpretation of the origin of the war. American historian Sidney Fay argued that all nations of Europe tried to avoid war but all also bear some blame for provoking it. The origin of the war could be found, he explained, in the long-term tensions caused by militarism and the arms race, nationalism and resulting conflicts over territory and control, economic imperialism, the system of entangling alliances, and the breakdown of diplomatic negotiations. Added to this were the immediate causes, the assassination of the Austro-Hungarian heir Franz Ferdinand and his wife Sophie by Serbian nationalists in Sarajevo, the ultimatum sent to the Serbs in response, the “blank check” of support offered to Austria-Hungary from the Germans, the Russian mobilization of their military followed by the French mobilization, and the English refusal to take sides and therefore deter Austro-Hungarian war against Serbia. These were faults of all the European nations that made them all in some way culpable for the war. In 1967 Fritz Fischer would challenge this assessment that the war was not wanted by any nation and yet caused by all of them by arguing, using new archival evidence and the new perspective on Germany after WWII, that Germany had “willed” a European war and actively provoked a war of aggression to add to her territory. This interpretation continues to dominate the scholarship today but has been nuanced more recently by different approaches to the ongoing debate of where responsibility lies for World War I.

Primary Sources

Leopold Baron von Andrian-Werburg, We Started the War (1918)

Leopold Andrian was a diplomat in the Austro-Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a trusted advisor of Count Leopold Berchtold who was the Imperial Foreign Minister in the years leading up to World War I. Baron Alexander von Musulin and Alek Hoyos were also in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Musulin drafted the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia and Hoyos negotiated the “blank check,” promise of military support from Germany in July 1914, after the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. Fritz Szápary delivered the Austro-Hungarian declaration of war to Russia on August 6, 1914.

We started the war, not the Germans and even less the Entente—that I know . . . I have the distinct impression that the war was decided on by that circle of younger talented diplomats who formed Berchtold’s political council, who influenced him strongly and who, if they were—as they were in this case—in agreement, decided things. Musulin, the impetuous chatterbox, who, when the prospects were good in the war, used to call himself ‘the man who caused the war’, Alek Hoyos, Fritz Szápary . . . they made the war. I myself was in lively agreement with the basic idea that only a war could save Austria. As the world situation was then, I am also quite sure that, two or three years later, war for Austria’s existence would have been forced on us by Serbia, Rumania and Russia, and under conditions which would make a successful defense far more difficult than at that time.

1. Who does Leopold Andrian blame for the outbreak of World War I?

a. Austria-Hungary

b. Germany

c. Serbia

2. How does he try to justify Austria’s choice at the end?

a. He believed that war would have been forced on Austria-Hungary later when they were less prepared for it if they hadn’t declared it in 1914.

b. He believed Germany would have continued to push them to enter a war if they had not themselves declared it.

c. He believed they could have secured a lasting peace for the whole region including Romania and Russia had they simply avoided the conflict with Serbia.

3. Why might Musulin have only called himself “the man who caused the war” when “prospects were good in the war”?

a. He only wanted responsibility for the war if it was going well and Austria-Hungary was winning, not if they lost.

b. When policy changed in the middle of the war he no longer recognized his original strategy and therefore distanced himself from its origin

c. He knew that he had not had any role in the origin of the war but he wanted publicity for others’ accomplishments

The Blank Check (1914)

On July 5, Alek Hoyos delivered a letter from Berchtold and Austro-Hungarian emperor Francis Joseph to German Imperial Chancellor, Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg. The letter blamed the Serbian government for the assassination and asked for military support from Germany, their ally since 1879. The following day, Bethmann-Hollweg telegrammed the German Ambassador at Vienna, Heinrich von Tschirschky, a statement of German support that has become known as the “blank check” for its lack of any limitations on German support of Austria-Hungary’s war aims.

His Majesty sends his thanks to the Emperor Francis Joseph for his letter and would soon answer it personally. In the meantime His Majesty desires to say that he is not blind to the danger which threatens Austria-Hungary and thus the Triple Alliance as a result of the Russian and Serbian Pan-Slavic agitation. Even though His Majesty is known to feel no unqualified confidence in Bulgaria and her ruler, and naturally inclines more toward our old ally Rumania and her Hohenzollern prince, yet he quite understands that the Emperor Francis Joseph, in view of the attitude of Rumania and of the danger of a new Balkan alliance aimed directly at the Danube Monarchy, is anxious to bring about an understanding between Bulgaria and the Triple alliance . . . His Majesty will, furthermore, make an effort at Bucharest, according to the wishes of the Emperor Francis Joseph, to influence King Carol to the fulfilment of the duties of his alliance, to the renunciation of Serbia, and to the suppression of the Rumanian agitations directed against Austria-Hungary. Finally, as far as concerns Serbia, His Majesty, of course, cannot interfere in the dispute now going on between Austria-Hungary and that country, as it is a matter not within his competence. The Emperor Francis Joseph may, however, rest assured that His Majesty will faithfully stand by Austria-Hungary, as is required by the obligations of his alliance and of his ancient friendship.

1. In the blank check, who does Bethmann-Hollweg blame for the unrest in Europe after the assassination of Franz Ferdinand?

a. Russian and Serbian Pan-Slavic agitation

b. Austrian and German territorial aggression

c. English imperial conquests and industrial competition

2. Which new nation does he understand Austria-Hungary might now want to add to the Triple Alliance?

a. Bulgaria

b. Italy

c. Bosnia

3. Many historians view this document as evidence of Germany’s culpability for provoking World War I. What line indicates this culpability?

a. “The Emperor Francis Joseph may, however, rest assured that His Majesty will faithfully stand by Austria-Hungary, as is required by the obligations of his alliance and of his ancient friendship”

b. “As far as concerns Serbia, His Majesty, of course, cannot interfere in the dispute now going on between Austria-Hungary and that country, as it is a matter not within his competence.”

c. “His Majesty desires to say that he is not blind to the danger which threatens Austria-Hungary and thus the Triple Alliance as a result of the Russian and Serbian Pan-Slavic agitation.”

Austro-Hungarian Ultimatum to Serbia, July 23, 1914

After the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand on June 28, 1914, the Austro-Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs drafted an ultimatum blaming the Serb government in Belgrade for supporting the terrorists who carried out the assassination. The ultimatum was sent from Imperial Foreign Minister Berchtold to the Austro-Hungarian diplomat in Belgrade, Baron Wladimir Giesl von Gieslingen, with instructions to deliver it to the Serbian government on July 23. The ultimatum demanded Serbia punish all associated with the assassination and quash all nationalist and anti-Austrian propaganda and organizations like Narodna Odbrana, a paramilitary organization created to protest the Austro-Hungarian annexation of Bosnia in 1908. The Serb government was given forty-eight hours to respond or risk declaration of war.

Now the history of the past few years, and particularly the painful events of the 28th of June, have proved the existence of a subversive movement in Serbia, whose object it is to separate certain portions of its territory from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. This movement, which came into being under the very eyes of the Serbian Government, subsequently found expression outside of the territory of the Kingdom in acts of terrorism, in a number of attempts at assassination, and in murders.

. . . The Royal Serbian Government has done nothing to suppress this movement. It has tolerated the criminal activities of the various unions and associations directed against the Monarchy, the unchecked utterances of the press, the glorification of the authors of assassinations, the participation of officers and officials in subversive intrigues; it has tolerated an unhealthy propaganda in its public instruction; and it has tolerated, finally, every manifestation which could betray the people of Serbia into hatred of the Monarchy and contempt for its institutions. This toleration of which the Royal Serbian Government was guilty, was still in evidence at that moment when the events of the twenty-eighth of June exhibited to the whole world the dreadful consequences of such tolerance. It is clear from the statements and confessions of the criminal authors of the assassination of the twenty-eighth of June, that the murder at Sarajevo was conceived at Belgrade, that the murderers received the weapons and the bombs with which they were equipped from Serbian officers and officials who belonged to the Narodna Odbrana, and, finally, that the dispatch of the criminals and of their weapons to Bosnia was arranged and effected under the conduct of Serbian frontier authorities. The results brought out by the inquiry no longer permit the Imperial and Royal Government to maintain the attitude of patient tolerance which it has observed for years toward those agitations which center at Belgrade and are spread thence into the territories of the Monarchy. Instead, these results impose upon the Imperial and Royal Government the obligation to put an end to those intrigues, which constitute a standing menace to the peace of the Monarchy. In order to attain this end, the Imperial and Royal Government finds itself compelled to demand that the Serbian Government give official assurance that it will condemn the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary.

1. Who does the ultimatum blame for the outbreak of war?

a. Serbia

b. Germany

c. Austrian Royal Government

2. Why does Austria-Hungary blame the Royal Serbian government for the assassination?

a. It has not suppressed the nationalist movements and it has allowed nationalist utterances in the press.

b. It has glorified the assassins and allowed its officials to participate in subversive intrigues

c. It has provided weapons to the Black Hand and planned the assassination attempt

d. All of the above ms

3. What specific evidence of governmental support does it say it has obtained from its inquiry into the assassination?

a. The assassins confessed to getting bombs and weapons from Serbian officials

b. The assassination was conceived at Belgrade, the political capital of Serbia

c. The Serbian government has officially accepted responsibility for the attack on June 28

d. A and B are correct ms

Telegram July 29 from Sazonov to Isvolsky (1914)

Sergei Sazonov was the Russian Foreign Minister in the years leading up to World War I. Alexander Isvolsky was the Russian ambassador to France and also responsible for maintaining a strong Russian–British alliance. Supposedly Isvolsky cried out at the news of the outbreak of World War I, “C’est ma guerre!” [“This is my war!”] A flurry of telegrams were sent between Russia and Germany during the days after Austria-Hungary’s declaration of war on Serbia July 28 and Germany’s declaration of war on Russia August 1. This telegram reflects the Russian reaction to German demands to demobilize.

The German Ambassador today informed me of the decision of his Government to mobilize, if Russia did not stop her military preparations. Now, in point of fact, we only began these preparations in consequence of the mobilization already undertaken by Austria, and owing to her evident unwillingness to accept any means of arriving at a peaceful settlement of her dispute with Serbia. As we cannot comply with the wishes of Germany, we have no alternative but to hasten our own military preparations and to assume that war is probably inevitable. Please inform the French Government of this, and add that we are sincerely grateful to them for the declaration which the French Ambassador made to me on their behalf, to the effect that we could count fully upon the assistance of our ally, France. In the existing circumstances, that declaration is especially valuable to us. It would be extremely desirable if England were also without delay to align herself with France and Russia, since only in this manner could she succeed in preventing a dangerous disturbance of the balance of power in Europe.

1. Who does Sazanov blame for Russia’s decision to mobilize?

a. Austria because Austria mobilized against Serbia first.

b. Serbia because Serbia requested their assistance against Austrian aggression

c. Germany because German support for Austria required Russian support for Serbia

2. What does Sazanov admit continued Russian mobilization will lead to?

a. War will be inevitable if mobilization continues.

b. Russian mobilization will frighten Austria and deter further conflict

c. If Russian mobilization continues it will force England to enter the war

3. How does he describe the French declaration of support for her Russian ally?

a. The declaration said that Russia could count fully upon the assistance of their ally, France with no stipulations.

b. The declaration promised support for Russia but only if Russia were fighting a defensive war.

c. The declaration promised Russia support if Russia were to engage against Germany, but not if the war was only against Austria.

4. Why does he say that England must get involved too?

a. England must join to prevent a dangerous disturbance of the balance of power in Europe.

b. England must get involved to protect her colonial empire overseas.

c. England must get involved to protect the Belgian neutrality that Germany has violated.

Scholarly Sources

Annika Mambauer, The Origins of the First World War: Controversies and Consensus (London: Longman, 2002) 22–33.

Annika Mambauer is Senior Lecturer in Modern European History at Open University in Great Britain. Her other books include a study on Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War.

Attempts to allocate blame for the outbreak of war in 1914 began even before the fighting had started. Understandably, all governments emphasized the defensive nature of their actions. For all combatant nations, it was imperative that their own population felt they were fighting a just and justified war, in which they were defending their country against an aggressive enemy. . . .

In Vienna the ‘disguise’ of an ultimatum to the government in Belgrade, worded to be deliberately unacceptable, attempted to put the blame for the outbreak of the war on Serbia. In Britain, France, Belgium, and Russia, people were in no doubt that the aggressors had been located in Berlin and Vienna, while their own nations were either defending themselves, as in the case of Russia, France and Belgium, or were coming to the rescue of a weaker neighbor and the defense of their alliance partners, as in the case of Britain. . . . Stating and proving one’s innocence in bringing about the war was of crucial importance both before and during the war, and was not just a product of the postwar peace agreement.

Conscious efforts were made in Berlin to make Germany appear threatened and ultimately attacked, with Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg blaming Russia for the escalation of the crisis. . . . When war had become a reality, the chief of the Kaiser’s navy cabinet, Admiral Georg Alexander von Müller, recorded in his diary: ‘Brilliant mood. The government has succeeded very well in making us appear as the attacked.’ . . .

Given the general conviction on all sides that the opponents had caused the war, and given the length and severity of the conflict, it was naturally becoming increasingly difficult, if not impossible, to have a dispassionate debate about its origins. . . .

The Allies’ assumption of German guilt was transferred straight to the conference table once the war had come to an end. With relatively little actual evidence to back their claim, the victors agreed quickly in their decision on war guilt, blaming Germany and her allies for the war . . .

. . . It was with the Treaty of Versailles that the real need for explaining the origins of the First World War arose, and that the debate which was to continue for almost the rest of the century began in earnest.

1. What does Mambauer say about when the effort to place and avoid blame for the war started?

a. It began even before the fighting started.

b. It began when both sides tried to encourage the US to enter.

c. It began with historians debating the question as soon as the war ended.

2. Why was the question of origin of the war so important to argue at the beginning of the war?

a. Each country’s people needed to be convinced they were fighting a defensive war against an aggressor.

b. It was important to show Germany as the primary aggressor since they were the country that would be primarily punished.

c. As the historians began writing the history of the war, the first question they had to explain was why it had started.

3. Why was it important after the war ended?

a. The death and destruction needed to be paid for and the cost would fall on those who were blamed for starting the war.

b. The Allies argued Germany had caused the war since they planned to cripple the German ability to make war in the future with the Versailles Treaty.

c. It was important for the guilty party to be identified since they would most likely be the primary aggressor in the next war too.

d. A and B are correct ms

4. What does Müller’s diary entry suggest about the origins of the war?

a. Germany helped provoke the war but successfully convinced its people that they were the ones who had been attacked.

b. Austria was the true cause of the war but they shifted the blame to Germany.

c. Serbia was the true cause of the war and the Allies were right to place all the blame with their government officials.

Fritz Fischer, Germany’s Aims in the First World War (1967).

Fritz Fischer is recognized as one of the leading German historians of World War I and his book Germany’s Aims in the First World War was one of the most controversial on the topic. His analysis completely overturned the interpretation of Sidney Fay, popular since the 1930s, that all the nations of Europe bore responsibility for the war and that Germany had been a victim of her alliances and had tried to prevent war through diplomatic channels in the weeks of the July crisis. Although Fischer blames German aggression for World War I, he was a patriotic German and fought in World War II for the Nazis (he resigned from the Nazi Party in 1942 despite personal risk in doing so). He was a professor at the University of Hamburg after the war and remained in Germany until his death in 1999.

There is no question but that the conflict of military and political interests, of resentment and ideas, which found expression in the July crisis, left no government of any of the European powers quite free of some measure of responsibility—greater or smaller—for the outbreak of the war in one respect or another. It is, however, not the purpose of this work to enter into the familiar controversy . . . over the question of war guilt . . .

. . . We are concerned solely with the German leaders’ objectives and with the policy actually followed by them in the July crisis, and that only in so far as their policy throws light on the postulates and origins of Germany’s war aims.

. . . As Germany willed and coveted the Austro-Serbian war and, in her confidence in her military superiority, deliberately faced the risk of a conflict with Russia and France, her leaders must bear a substantial share of the historical responsibility for the outbreak of general war in 1914. This responsibility is not diminished by the fact that at the last moment Germany tried to arrest the march of destiny, for her efforts to influence Vienna were due exclusively to the threat of British intervention and, even so, they were half-hearted, belated, and immediately revoked.

It is true that German politicians and publicists…have invariably maintained that the war was forced on Germany or at least . . . that Germany’s share of the responsibility was no greater than that of the other participants. But confidential exchanges between Germany and Austria, and between the responsible figures in Germany itself . . . throw a revealing spotlight on the real responsibility.

A few weeks after the outbreak of war . . . the Austrians asked urgently for German help against the superior Russian armies facing them. It was refused. Count Tisza then advised Berchtold to tell the Germans: “That we took our decision to go to war on the strength of the express statements both of the German emperor and of the German Imperial Chancellor that they regarded the moment as suitable and would be glad if we showed ourselves in earnest.”. . .

The official documents afford ample proofs that during the July crisis the Emperor, the German military leaders and the Foreign Ministry were pressing Austria-Hungary to strike against Serbia without delay.

1. What does Fischer say initially about the origins of World War I?

a. Every country bears some responsibility for its outbreak.

b. Only Serbia and Austria should bear any blame for World War I.

c. The war was accidental and inevitable and therefore no country bears the blame for its origin.

2. How does he describe Germany’s role?

a. Germany willed and coveted the Austro-Serbian war and deliberately faced war with Russia and France therefore they bear a substantial share of the responsibility for the war.

b. Germany had offered the support for Austria as required by their alliance but they were then pulled into a war they did not want to fight.

c. Germany was looking for a way to strike against Serbia and end their petty quarrels once and for all with a major offensive.

3. Why does he not believe Germany’s negotiations for peace in the last days of July rid her of her responsibility?

a. Germany’s negotiations to find a peace were half-hearted, belated, and immediately revoked

b. Even though Germany was desperately trying to find a peaceful solution and avoid the war, it does not erase the blame they bear for its origin.

c. The German efforts to find a peaceful solution were not successful despite their best efforts therefore they must still be held accountable for the war.

4. What does Fischer say Count Tisza, Prime Minister of Hungary, believed was the reason Austria-Hungary declared war?

a. Because both the German emperor and the German Imperial Chancellor encouraged them to go to war

b. Because their anger with Serbia over the assassination was so great that they felt obligated to declare war.

c. Because they believed that the war would remain contained and that Serbia would be their only opponent.

Keir Lieber, “The New History of World War I and What It Means for International Relations Theory,” International Security 32, no. 2 (Fall, 2007) 155–91.

Keir A. Lieber is Associate Professor in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. His work explores the causes of war, international relations theory, deterrence, nuclear weapons, and US foreign policy.

Most scholars acknowledge Germany’s key role in the outbreak of the war and assign Germany a greater share of the blame, though almost always in qualified terms. For example, the common account holds that German leaders preferred a local war in the Balkans and may have been willing to risk a continental war against France and Russia, but they never sought or expected a broader European war involving Great Britain. Similarly, international relations scholars often state that the Germans . . . were unprepared and overwhelmed by crisis escalation dynamics on the eve of war and did not expect the cataclysm that ensued.

Newly available primary source material challenges many of the long-held assumptions about the origins of World War I . . . The evidence suggests that German leaders went to war in 1914 with eyes wide open. They provoked a war to achieve their goal of dominating the European continent, and did so aware that the coming conflict would almost certainly be long and bloody. They neither misjudged the nature of modern military technology nor attacked out of fear of Germany’s enemies moving first. . . .

. . . The German innocence campaign gained ground in the interwar period in part due to the work of the American revisionist Sidney Fay, who argued that no one country was to blame for war, and Harry Barnes, who portrayed Russia and France as the aggressors and Germany and Austria-Hungary as the victims. . . . By the 1930s, the consensus view in much of Europe held that no country wanted war in 1914 and that all the major powers deserved blame for allowing the diplomatic crisis that summer to escalate out of control.

Two hugely controversial books by Fritz Fischer, however, challenged this consensus. . . . Germany’s Aims in the First World War argued that World War I was a war of aggression engineered by Germany. German leaders not only willed a local war in the Balkans but also launched a “grab for world power” [Weltpolitik] that would likely result in a wider European war. . . .

The newest evidence about decision making during the July crisis, however, suggests that German leaders did not lose control of events on the eve of war, but rather capitalized on what they viewed as a golden opportunity to start the war they wanted.

1. What does Lieber say most scholars believe about Germany’s initial expectations for the scope of the war?

a. They wanted a limited war in the Balkans.

b. They knew they risked war against France and Russia.

c. They did not expect war with Great Britain too.

d. All of the above MS

2. How does he say the most recent research views their entry into war?

a. They went into the war with their eyes wide open knowing the war would be long and bloody.

b. They were caught off guard and did not expect a war with any powers other than Serbia.

c. They assumed the …