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Philosophical Explorations
An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action
ISSN: 1386-9795 (Print) 1741-5918 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rpex20
The ontology of artifacts
Lynne Rudder Baker
To cite this article: Lynne Rudder Baker (2004) The ontology of artifacts, Philosophical
Explorations, 7:2, 99-111, DOI: 10.1080/13869790410001694462
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THE ONTOLOGY OF ARTIFACTS
Lynne Rudder Baker
Beginning with Aristotle, philosophers have taken artifacts to be ontologically deficient. This paper
proposes a theory of artifacts, according to which artifacts are ontologically on a par with other
material objects. I formulate a nonreductive theory that regards artifacts as constituted by?but
not identical to?aggregates of particles. After setting out the theory, I rebut a number of
arguments that disparage the ontological status of artifacts.
Introduction
Artifacts are objects intentionally made to serve a given purpose. The term ?artifact?
applies to many different kinds of things?tools, documents, jewelery, scientific instruments, machines, furniture, and so on. Most generally, artifacts are contrasted with
natural objects like rocks, trees, dogs, that are not made by human beings (or by higher
primates). The category of artifact, as opposed to the category of natural object, includes
sculptures, paintings, literary works and performances; however, here I shall put aside
these fascinating artifacts and focus only on artifacts that have practical functions. Artifacts
with practical functions are everywhere. We sleep in beds; we are awakened by clocks; we
eat with knives and forks; we drive cars; we write with computers (or with pencils); we manufacture nails. Without artifacts, there would be no recognizable human life.
My plan for this paper is first to propose a theory of artifacts, a theory based on the
notion of material constitution that I have deployed elsewhere. Although the examples that
I?ll consider are laughably simple, I hope that the general theory will apply to sophisticated
technical artifacts as well. After setting out my theory, I want to defend the ontological
status of artifacts against philosophers?from Aristotle to Leibniz to Peter van Inwagen?
who find artifacts ontologically deficient.
The Idea of Constitution
Constitution, I believe, is the glue of the material world. Constitution is a very general
relation that we are all familiar with (though probably not under that label). A river at any
moment is constituted by an aggregate of water molecules. But the river is not identical
to the aggregate of water molecules that constitutes it at that moment. Since one and the
same river?call it R?is constituted by different aggregates of molecules at different
times, the river is not identical to any of the aggregates of water molecules that make it
up. So, constitution is not identity.1 Another way to see that constitution is not identity is
to notice that even if an aggregate of molecules, A1, actually constitutes R at t1, R might
have been constituted by a different aggregate of molecules, A2, at t1. So, constitution is a
relation that is in some ways similar to identity, but is not actually identity. If the relation
between a person and her body is constitution, then a person is not identical to her body.
Philosophical Explorations, Vol. 7, No 2, 2004
ISSN 1386-9795 print/1741-5918 online/04/020099-13
# 2004 Taylor & Francis Ltd DOI: 10.1080/13869790410001694462
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LYNNE RUDDER BAKER
On the constitution view, reality comes in fundamentally different kinds. Each existing
thing is of a primary kind. An entity?s primary kind is given by the answer to the Aristotelian
question: what is x most fundamentally? There is no ?mere thing? behind or underlying the
instance of a primary kind. Every object has its primary kind essentially, and entities of different primary kinds have different persistence conditions. Constitution is a relation between
things of different primary kinds. Constitution brings into existence new objects of higherlevel primary kinds than what was there before. For example, when a certain combination
of chemicals is in a certain environment, a thing of a new kind comes into existence: an
organism. A world with the same kinds of chemicals but a different environment may
lack organisms, and a world without organisms is ontologically different from a world
with organisms. So, constitution makes an ontological difference.2
An entity cannot lose its primary-kind property and still exist: if an organism ceased to
be an organism, it would cease to exist. To take another example, being a coin is a primarykind property, but being an item in a pocket is not. An item in a pocket could cease to be an
item in a pocket (say, it was taken out) without going out of existence; a coin could not
cease to be a coin (say, it was melted down) without going out of existence. The mark
of a primary-kind property is this: things of a given primary kind cannot survive loss of
their primary-kind properties.
If x constitutes y,3 then the identity of the resulting thing is determined by y ?s primary
kind. Primary kinds include not only kinds determined by structure or by material constituent, or by underlying essence; but also there are primary kinds determined by function.
Underlying the Constitution View is the idea that what something is most fundamentally
is often determined by what it can do?its abilities and capacities?rather than by what
it is made of. This is obvious in the case of artifacts: what makes something a clock is its
function of telling time, no matter what it is made of.
Whether we are talking about rivers, human persons, clocks or countless other constituted things, the basic idea of constitution is this: when certain things of certain kinds
(aggregates of water molecules, human organisms) are in certain circumstances (different
circumstances for different kinds of things), then new entities of different kinds come into
existence. The circumstances in which an aggregate of water molecules comes to constitute a river have to do with the relation of the water molecules to each other; they form
a stream.4 The circumstances in which a human organism comes to constitute a human
person have to do with development of a first-person perspective. In each case, new
things of new kinds, with new kinds of causal powers, come into being. An organism?
but not the aggregate of cells that constitutes it?can eat its prey. A flag?but not the
aggregate of pieces of cloth?may cause a veteran to cry. Since constitution is the
vehicle, so to speak, by which new kinds of things come into existence in the natural
world, it is obvious that constitution is not identity.
Let me defend the claim that constitution is not identity. The familiar properties of
identity are reflexivity (everything is necessarily identical to itself; A(a ? a)); symmetry (if
a ? b, then b ? a); and transitivity (if a ? b and b ? c, then a ? c). Like Leibniz, Kripke
and other philosophers, I take identity to be necessary, not merely contingent: if a ? b,
then necessarily a ? b. If a ? b, it is logically impossible for a to exist and b not to exist.
Not only do a and b actually have all the same properties, but they could not differ in
THE ONTOLOGY OF ARTIFACTS
any properties?even modal properties, properties that it is necessary or merely possible
that an object has. This strict view of identity is the classical view.
It is obvious that constitution is not strict identity. Consider a brick house. It seems to
me pretheoretically obvious that although the aggregate of bricks constitutes the house,
the house does not constitute the aggregate of bricks. It also seems pretheoretically
obvious that the house does not constitute itself. So, constitution is neither reflexive nor
symmetric. Hence, constitution is not identity. But put aside these intuitions of mine. The
interesting case concerns modal properties. Your body would still exist now even if you
had just had a haircut. If you had just had a haircut, then although your body would still
exist now, a different aggregate of cells would constitute your body now. It follows that
your body is not identical to the aggregate of cells that constitutes your body now.
A question arises: how is it that a boat, say, and the non-identical aggregate of planks
and nails5 that constitute it at t share so many properties at t? If the aggregate of planks and
nails sinks at t, so does the boat; if the boat is sold at t, so is the aggregate of planks and
nails that makes up the boat. The reason that the boat and aggregate of planks and nails
share so many properties is that constitution is a relationship of unity. Many properties (but
not modal properties or certain temporal properties) are borrowed from a constitutional
partner. An object x may have such a property derivatively if x is constitutionally related
to y, and y has the property independently of y?s constitution relations to x. For example,
the aggregate of planks and nails has the property at t of being a boat. This is so
because the aggregate constitutes a boat at t, and the boat has the property at t (and at
every moment of its existence) of being a boat non-derivatively.
In short, constitution is a relation that accounts for the appearance of genuinely new
kinds of things with new kinds of causal powers. If F and G are primary kinds and Fs constitutes
Gs, then an inventory of the contents of the world that includes Fs but leaves out Gs is incomplete.6 Gs are not reducible to Fs.7 Indeed, this conception is relentlessly anti-reductive.
Artifacts and Aggregates
Typically artifacts are constituted by aggregates of things. But not always: an anvil is
constituted by a piece of heavy metal; a paperclip is constituted by a small piece of thin
wire; and a 50 Euro note is constituted by a piece of paper. Nevertheless, even those artifacts (like paperclips) that are constituted by a single object are, at a lower level, constituted
by aggregates of atoms. So, I?ll here consider artifacts to be constituted by aggregates of
things, not by a single object. Any items whatever are an aggregate; and an aggregate is
determined wholly by the items in it. The identity conditions of aggregates are simple:
aggregate x is identical to aggregate y just in case exactly the same items are in aggregate
x and aggregate y. So, we have a principle governing the existence of an aggregate:
(E-Agg) For any objects?call them ?the xs??there is an aggregate such that, necessarily,
the aggregate exists whenever all the xs exist.
Since every x?every concrete thing?is of a primary kind essentially, we may identify
the items (the xs) in an aggregate by their primary kinds. The items in an aggregate may
include some items whose primary kind is F, and some whose primary kind is G, and so
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LYNNE RUDDER BAKER
on. If aggregates are to constitute various kinds of artifacts, then aggregates themselves
(and not just the items in them) must be of primary kinds. We may assign a primary kind
to an aggregate of xs of various primary kinds. Suppose that the boat called ?Boat? is constituted by a certain aggregate of planks and nails at t. The aggregate of planks and nails
has a primary kind by courtesy. The primary kind of that aggregate is a hybrid: plank/nail.
So, we have a principle governing the primary kind of an aggregate:
(PK-Agg) The primary kind of an aggregate of xs, where each of the xs is of primary kind F
or of primary kind G or of primary kind H. . ., is the hybrid primary kind F/G/H. . .
Each of the items in the aggregate of planks and nails is itself an artifact. A plank is constituted by an aggregate of cellulose molecules and a nail is constituted by an aggregate of
iron atoms. So, the aggregate of the planks and nails is itself constituted by an aggregate of
natural non-artifactual things: cellulose molecules and iron atoms. And so on down to aggregates of subatomic particles. Although planks and nails (as well as the boat) are artifacts, the
planks and nails are constituted by aggregates of natural objects. So, constitution does not
distinguish artifacts and non-artifacts (natural objects). The constitution relation holds
between artifacts, between artifacts and non-artifacts, and between non-artifacts.8
Now consider some of the distinctive features of artifacts. Most prominently, artifacts
have proper functions that they are (intentionally) designed and produced to perform
(whether they perform their proper functions or not).9 What distinguishes artifactual
primary kinds from other primary kinds is that an artifactual primary kind entails a
proper function, where a proper function is a purpose or use intended by a producer.
(Indeed, the general term for an artifact?e.g. polisher, scraper, life preserver?often just
names the proper function of the artifact.) Thus, an artifact has its proper function essentially: the nature of an artifact lies in its proper function?what it was designed to do,
the purpose for which it was produced.10
The proper function of a boat is to provide transportation on water. The proper function of an artifact is the intended function. An artifact may in fact never perform its proper
function: perhaps a boat is never actually put in water, or perhaps it malfunctions (sinks on
launching). The aggregate of planks and nails that constitutes a boat at t inherits the proper
function of a boat. But the aggregate of planks and nails only contingently has the function
of providing aquatic transportation, in virtue of constituting a boat at t. The boat has its
proper function essentially; the aggregate of the planks and nails that constitutes the
boat at t has its proper function only contingently. After some of the planks are replaced
at t 0 , say, the aggregate that constituted the boat at t no longer constitutes it; and
hence the aggregate that constituted the boat at t no longer has the proper function of
providing aquatic transportation.
What proper function an artifact has determines what the artifact most fundamentally is?a boat, a jackhammer, a microscope, and so on. And what proper function an artifact has is determined by the intentions of its designer and/or producer. Here, then, are
four conditions that I propose as necessary and sufficient for x?s being an artifact:11
(A1) x has one or more makers, producers or authors. Designers and executors of design
(perhaps the same people) are authors.
THE ONTOLOGY OF ARTIFACTS
(A2) x ?s primary kind (its essence, its proper function) is determined in part by the
intentions of its authors.
(A3) x?s existence depends on the intentions of its authors and the execution of those
intentions.
(A4) x is constituted by an aggregate that the authors have arranged or selected12 to serve
the proper function entailed by the artifact?s primary kind.
(A1) to (A4) are, I hope, an adequate account of artifacts. Now I want to modify my
general definition of ?constitution? (given in Baker 2000) to accommodate (A1) to (A4),
and hence to accommodate artifacts. I?ll illustrate with a boat and an aggregate of
planks and nails. The modification of the definition is to place a twofold condition on an
aggregate that can constitute a boat:
(i)
(ii)
the aggregate must contain enough items of suitable structure to enable the proper
function of the artifact to be performed?in the current example, the function of
providing aquatic transportation?whether the proper function actually is ever performed
or not; and
the items in the aggregate must be available for assembly in a way suitable for enabling
the proper function of the artifact to be performed.
Call an aggregate that satisfies these two conditions ?an appropriate aggregate?.
One further preliminary: according to my general definition of ?constitution?, if x
constitutes y at t, and y?s primary kind is G, then x is in what I called ?G-favourable
circumstances? at t. If a certain aggregate of planks and nails constitutes a boat at t,
then the aggregate must be in boat-favourable circumstances at t. Consideration of artifacts suggests that we should distinguish two kinds of G-favourable circumstances for
boats, say: (i) the circumstances in which a boat may come into existence and (ii) the
circumstances in which an existing boat continues to exist. The circumstances in which
a boat comes into existence are more stringent than those for a boat?s remaining in existence. So, let me spell out some features of boat-favourable circumstances for a boat?s
coming into existence.
The boat-favourable circumstances concern the relations between an appropriate
aggregate for boats, designers and/or builders. For example, (i) the aggregate must be
in the presence of one or more persons who know how to build a boat from the items
in the aggregate, and who either intend to build a boat from the items in the aggregate
or whose activity is directed by someone who intends to have a boat built from the
items in the aggregate; (ii) the items in the aggregate must be manipulated by such
persons (either manually or by machine) in ways that execute their productive intentions
or of those directing the persons; and (iii) the result of the manipulation must satisfy the
productive intentions of the persons.
Now with the notions of an appropriate aggregate and boat-favourable circumstances, we can adapt the general definition of ?x constitutes y at t? to a boat. Call the particular aggregate of planks and nails ?Agg? and the boat ?Boat?.
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LYNNE RUDDER BAKER
Agg constitutes Boat at t if and only if: there are distinct primary kinds, boat and plank/
nail, and boat-favourable circumstances such that:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Agg is an appropriate aggregate of primary-kind plank/nail & Boat is of
primary-kind boat; &
Agg and Boat are spatially coincident at t; &
Agg is in boat-favourable circumstances at t; &
A8z8t [(z is of primary-kind plank/nail & z is in boat-favourable circumstances at t) ! 9u (u is of primary-kind boat & u is spatially coincident
with z at t)]; &
S9tf(Agg exists at t & 9w [w is of primary-kind boat & w is coincident
with Agg at t])g13
When this biconditional holds, (A1) to (A4) are satisfied. (A1) to (A3) are satified when
Agg is in boat-favourable circumstances, and (A4) is satisfied when Agg and Boat fit the
definition. Boat is non-derivatively an artifact; indeed, the boat is essentially an artifact:
there is no possible world in which that boat exists and is not an artifact. Agg at t is derivatively an artifact. Agg would not be an artifact if it hadn?t constituted an artifact. Even
though the planks and nails in Agg are themselves artifacts, the aggregate of artifacts is
not an artifact. (No one produces an aggregate; it comes into existence automatically,
and an aggregate has no proper function.) This completes a sketch of a theory of artifacts
made up from aggregates of items.
Here are some advantages of this view. First, it allows for novel artifacts?objects with
new proper functions. An artifact?s having a proper function depends in part on the
author?s intentions, and not on any history of selection and reproduction as proper functions in biology are. So, prototypes of innovative artifacts have proper functions.
(Vermaas and Houkes take this to be a criterion of adequacy for a theory of functions.)
Second, this account allows?as it should?that a single boat may survive various replacement of planks and nails. After replacement even of a nail, Agg would still exist (assuming
that the replaced nail was not destroyed), but Agg would no longer constitute Boat; some
other aggregate would. (So, again, we see that Agg = Boat.) Third, this account accords
artifacts ontological status as artifacts. An artifact has as great a claim as a natural object
to be a genuine substance. This is so because artifactual kinds are primary kinds. Their functions are their essences. Despite my touting the ontological status of artifacts as an advantage of the constitution view of artifacts, many philosophers would disagree. To such
philosophers I now want to turn.
The Ontological Status of Artifacts
Many important philosophers?from Aristotle on?hold artifacts ontologically in low
regard. Some philosophers have gone so far as to argue that ?artifacts such as ships, houses,
hammers, and so forth, do not really exist? (Hoffman and Rosenkrantz 1997, 173).14 Artifacts
are thought to be lacking in some ontological way: they are considered not genuine substances. Although the notion of substance is a vexed one in philosophy, what I mean by
saying that things of some kind?Fs (e.g. hammers, dogs, persons)?are genuine
THE ONTOLOGY OF ARTIFACTS
substances is that any full account of the furniture of the world will have to include reference to Fs. I shall argue that there is no reasonable basis for distinguishing between artifacts
and natural objects in a way that renders natural objects as genuine substances and
artifacts as ontologically deficient.
I shall consider five possible ways of distinguishing between natural objects and artifacts, all of which are mentioned or alluded to by David Wiggins.15 On none of these, I shall
argue, do natural objects, but not artifacts, turn out to be genuine substances. Let the
alphabetic letter ?F? be a placeholder for a name of a type of entity.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Fs are genuine substances only if Fs have an internal principle of activity.
Fs are genuine substances only if there are laws that apply to Fs as such, or there could be
a science of Fs.
Fs are genuine substances only if whether something is an F is not determined merely by
an entity?s satisfying a description.
Fs are genuine substances only if Fs have an underlying intrinsic essence.
Fs are genuine substances only if the identity and persistence of Fs is independent of any
intentional activity.
Let us consider (1) to (5) one at a time.
(1) The first condition?Fs are genuine substances only if Fs have an internal principle
of activity?has its source in Aristotle.16 Aristotle thinks that this condition distinguishes
objects that come from nature (e.g. animals and plants) from objects that come from
other efficient causes (e.g. beds). But it seems to me that this condition does not rule in
natural objects and rule out artifacts as genuine substances. Today, we would consider a
piece of gold (or any other chemical element) a natural object, but a piece of gold does
not have an internal principle of change; conversely, a heat-seeking missile is an artifact
that does have an internal principle of activity. So, the first condition does not distinguish
artifacts from natural objects.
(2) The second condition?Fs are genuine substances only if there are laws that apply
to Fs as such, or there could be a science of Fs?also allows artifacts to be genuine substances.
Engineering fields blur the line between natural objects and artifacts. Engineering schools
have courses in materials science (including advanced topics in concrete), traffic engineering,
transportation science, computer science?all of which quantify over artifacts. And if we consider laws to be counterfactual-supporting generalizations, then these engineering fields are
looking for laws. Even fields considered part of the natural sciences include artifactual as well
as natural materials in their domains. For example, polymers are large molecules made up of
repeating molecular units like beads on a string. ?Natural polymers include rubber, wool, and
cotton; synthetic polymers include nylon and polythene? (Barnes-Svarney 1995: 547).17 So,
some instances of polymers (e.g. those made of nylon) are artifacts; others (e.g. those
made of rubber) are natural objects. My university has a whole building devoted to
Polymer Science. Since something?s being of an artifactual kind does not preclude a
science of it, the second condition does not make artifacts less than genuine substances.
(3) The third condition?Fs are genuine substances only if whether something is an F is
not determined merely by an entity?s satisfying a description?is semantic. Demonstrative
reference is supposed to be essential to natural-kind terms.18 The reference of natural-kind
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terms is determined indexically; the reference of artifactual-kind terms is determined by satisfying a description.19 For example, this is what Wiggins says:
Artefacts are collected up not by reference to a theoretically hypothesized common
constitution but under functional descriptions that are precisely indifferent to specific constitution and particular mode of interaction with the environment. A clock is any time-keeping
device, a pen is any rigid ink-applying writing implement, and so on. (Wiggins 2001, 87)
Membership in a natural kind, it is thought, is not determined by satisfying a description, but by relevant similarity to stereotypes (e.g. Wiggins 2001, 11 ?12). The idea is this:
first, Fs are picked out by their superficial properties (e.g. quantities of water are clear
liquids, good to drink, etc.). Then, anything that has the same essential properties that
the stereotypes have is an F. So, natural kinds have ?extension-involving sortal identifications? (Wiggins 2001, 89). By contrast, artifactual terms (like those I used earlier?
?beds?, ?clocks?, ?knives and forks?, ?cars?, ?computers?, ?pencils?, ?nails?) are said to refer by
satisfying descriptions: ?A clock is any time-keeping device, a pen is any rigid ink-applying
writing implement and so on? (Wiggins 2001, 87).
I do not think that this distinction between how words refer captures the difference
between natural objects and artifacts.20 The distinction between referring indexically and
referring by description, with respect to natural-kind terms, is only a matter of the state of
our knowledge and of our perceptual systems.21 However gold was originally picked out
(e.g. as ?stuff like this?), now it can be given an explicit definition: gold is the element with
atomic number 79. Not only might natural kinds satisfy descriptions, but also we may identify
artifacts in the absence of any identifying description. For example, archeologists may believe
that two entities are both artifacts of the same kind, without having any identifying description of the kind in question. (Were they used in battle or in religious rituals?)
Thus, the third condition?Fs are genuine substances only if whether something is an
F is not determined merely by an entity?s satisfying a description?does not distinguish
natural kinds from artifactual kinds, nor does it rule out artifacts as genuine objects.22
(4) The fourth condition?Fs are genuine substances only if Fs have an underlying
intrinsic essence?does not distinguish natural from artifactual kinds. Although some familiar natural kinds?like water or gold?have underlying intrinsic essences, not all do. For
example, wings (of birds and insects), mountains and planets are all natural kinds, but
none of them has an underlying intrinsic essence. Their membership in their kinds is not
a matter of underlying intrinsic properties. Something is a wing, mountain or planet not
in virtue of what it is made of, but in virtue of its relational properties. For that matter, something is a bird or an insect in virtue of its relational properties?its genealogical lineage.
(5) The fifth condition?Fs are genuine substances only if the character of Fs is independent of any intentional activity?is the most interesting. According to some philosophers, the ?character of [a] substance-kind cannot logically depend upon the beliefs or
decisions of any psychological subject? (Hoffman and Rosenkrantz 1997, 173). Unlike the
first four conditions, the fifth does distinguish between artifactual and natural kinds. An
artifact?s being the kind of thing that it is depends on human intentions. Conceding that
the necessity of intention is a difference between an artifact and a natural object, I ask:
why should this difference render artifacts deficient?
THE ONTOLOGY OF ARTIFACTS
What generally underlies the claim that artifacts are not genuine substances, I
believe, is an assumption that Fs are genuine substances only if conditions of membership
in the substance-kind are set ?by nature, and not by us?.23 But it is tendentious to claim that
the existence of artifacts depends not on nature, but on us. Of course, the existence of artifacts depends on us: but we are part of nature. It would be true to say that the existence of
artifacts depends not on nature-as-if-we-did-not-exist, but on nature-with-us-in-it. Since
nature has us in it, this distinction (between nature-as-if-we-did-not-exist and naturewith-us-in-it) is no satisfactory basis for ontological inferiority of artifacts.
There is a venerable?but, I think, theoretically misguided?distinction in philosophy between what is mind-independent and what is mind-dependent. This distinction
is theoretically misguided because it draws an ontological line in an unilluminating place.
It puts insects and galaxies on one side, and after-images and artifacts on the other.
Another reason that the mind-independent/mind-dependent distinction is unhelpful is
that advances in technology have blurred the difference between natural objects and
artifacts. For example, so-called ?digital organisms? are computer programs that (like biological organisms) can mutate, reproduce and compete with one another (The Chronicle
of Higher Education: Daily News, 8 May 2003). Or consider ?robo-rats??rats with electrodes
that direct the rats? movements (The New York Times, 5 May 2002). Or for another
example, consider what one researcher calls ?a bacterial battery? (The New York Times,
18 September 2003).24 These are biofuel cells that use microbes to convert organic
matter into electricity. Bacterial batteries are the result of a recent discovery of a
micro-organism that feeds on sugar and converts it to a stream of electricity. This
leads to a stable source of low power that can be used to run sensors of household
devices. Finally, scientists are genetically engineering viruses that selectively infect and
kill cancer cells and leave healthy cells alone. Scientific American referred to these
viruses as ?search-and-destroy missiles?.25 Are these objects?the digital organisms,
robo-rats, bacterial batteries, genetically engineered viral search-and-destroy missiles?
artifacts or natural objects? Does it matter? I suspect that the distinction between
artifacts and natural objects will become increasingly fuzzy; and as it does, the mindindependent/mind-dependent distinction will fade away.
Let me conclude with a general argument for the ontological status of artifacts. An F
has ontological status in virtue of being an F only if the F?s existence depends on its being
an F. For example, your bicycle has ontological status in virtue of being a bicycle because it
would not exist at all if it were not a bicycle. By contrast, the items in your pocket have ontological status in virtue of being coins, handkerchiefs, keys, etc., not in virtue of being items
in your pocket, because they would (and most likely did) exist without being items in your
pocket. What has ontological significance in the first instance are properties?primary-kind
properties. (Item in a pocket is not a primary kind.)
When a new instance of a primary-kind property comes into being, a new object
comes into existence. A new bicycle is a new object in the world; a new item in a pocket
is not. And conversely, an item in a pocket can lose the property of being an item in
a pocket without going out of existence; a bicycle cannot lose the property of being a
bicycle without going out